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Output Markets and Price Risk
What are the characteristics of markets for agricultural output in the study
area and how variable are the prices in these markets? These questions are
raised in this chapter.
The first section characterizes marketing institutions available for the sample
households. After this descriptive section, quantitative analyses of price vari-
ability are attempted. In the second section, price variability of major agricul-
tural products during the harvest periods is estimated based on annual price
data in the nearby wholesale market. Estimates for the annual price variabil-
ity, which were obtained from regression results after control for trends and
autocorrelations, will be used as proxies to households’ expected price risk
when they decide on production plans. In the third section, spatial and
intertemporal price integration is investigated. From individual households’
viewpoint, price integration reduces the price risk since it prevents unneces-
sary price volatility. The price integration favors the sharing of risk across
regions and periods by smoothing price variations idiosyncratic to each local
market.
Before going into details, a note on market performance in developing coun-
tries would help understand the importance of the issues discussed in this
chapter, in addition to providing the necessary information for the following
chapters. The performance of agricultural markets has been an important is-
sue in development economics. Their efficient performance provides produc-
ers with information on technology and consumers’ preferences, thereby gen-
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erating dynamic production responses to changing market conditions. This
dynamics is an indispensable part of economic development. Since numerous
developing countries, including Pakistan, are currently promoting market lib-
eralization policies, the issues of market performance and price relations are
attracting the attention of academic and policy circles. Whether the reforms
will have the expected effects depends on the performance of each market
involved. The regression models in this chapter attempt to quantify the per-
formance from several angles.
I. Marketing Institutions in the Study Area
1. Marketing Infrastructure
Sample villages are close to a town with a population of approximately
fifteen thousand (see Map 2-2). The town is on the main road and the national
railway connecting two cities, Sheikhupura and Sargodha. It is a typical rural
town in the Punjab with developed infrastructure for agricultural marketing—
there is a local wholesale market (mandi) and a railway station in the town
area. Therefore, this town is the central place for agricultural marketing in the
study area. The distance from sample villages to the town is in the range of
about four to twenty kilometers. Most of the roads to the villages are paved
and regular bus services connect them with the town, although one of the five
sample villages had to be reached by an unpaved road for several kilometers
at the time of the survey.1
The study area has an active chain of private traders. Among these traders,
the most important is a commission agent called arhti working in mandi. An
arhti collects various agricultural commodities from growers and middlemen
and sells them to wholesalers, retailers, and processors on a commission ba-
sis. Transactions in mandi are subject to provincial regulations, including the
registration of arhtis in the Market Committee (Government of Punjab, Agri-
culture Department, Directorate of Economics and Marketing 1991).
Each sample village has village shops where daily goods are sold. These
shops also purchase a small amount of surplus food crops from farmers. How-
ever, for a large transaction, direct sales in the town or indirect sales via vil-
lage brokers (beopari) are more common.
2. Wheat Marketing
The Government of Pakistan implements a support-price scheme for wheat.
Although deregulation policies in wheat marketing have been implemented
since the mid 1980s, public intervention has remained important.2 The gov-
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ernment procures wheat from producers directly; it releases wheat flour to
consumers directly through utility stores owned by a government corporation
or indirectly through private markets. The prices of wheat marketed through
this route are fixed by the federal government: the provincial food depart-
ments and the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation
(PASSCO)3 procure wheat in harvest months at the “support” price; the pro-
vincial food departments release wheat flour in lean months at the “issue”
price. The difference between the issue price and the procurement price does
not cover all the storage cost from harvest months to the end of a food year
(Pinckney 1989b; Ender 1992).
The average share of the public procurement of wheat to the total produc-
tion during the study period was 31 per cent in the Punjab province and 14 per
cent in the Sheikhupura district (Government of Punjab, Bureau of Statistics
1992). Naqvi and Cornelisse (1986), based on field surveys, estimated the
percentage of marketable surplus of wheat in the province at 43 per cent.
Public procurement dominates wheat marketing, although the residual under
private marketing is substantial.
Officially, the support price is supposed to be announced in October, when
wheat sowing begins (Afzal et al. 1992). However, the announcement is often
delayed or revised later. Upward price revisions occurred in 1990/91, 1993/
94, and 1995/96 after wheat was sown. Thus, from the farmers’ point of view,
uncertainty exists regarding the wheat support price at the time when they
must decide on crop acreage.
There is a public procurement center of the PASSCO in the town. The pro-
vincial food department has no procurement facility because the two institu-
tions avoid direct competition for wheat procurement. This institutional frame-
work results in the following outlets of wheat for sample households: wheat
can be directly brought to the public procurement center; wheat can be brought
directly to the mandi and sold through commission agents on a commission
basis; wheat can be sold to or through beopari; or sold to village shopkeepers.
Although the sales to private agencies allowed farmers to store and sell later,
this practice was seldom observed mainly due to the lack of storage facilities
and lack of liquidity.
3. Basmati Paddy/Rice Marketing
Basmati marketing has a different institutional framework because paddy
is husked and cleaned in rice mills. The federal government announces a sup-
port price for paddy in the same manner as for wheat. The PASSCO is respon-
sible for supporting paddy prices. However, the quantity of basmati paddy
procured by the PASSCO was less than 2 per cent of the total production and
the proportion was negligible for the Sheikhupura district during the study
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period.4 The price of basmati paddy was to be supported indirectly through
the procurement of cleaned rice by the Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan
(RECP), a parastatal institution similar to the PASSCO. The RECP procured
cleaned rice from private rice millers and middlemen at a fixed procurement
price. It formerly owned rice mills, which were privatized during the research
period. In 1987/88, rice export was opened to the private sector.
In the study area, various basmati paddy outlets were observed: paddy could
be brought directly to the mandi and sold through commission agents on a
commission basis; sold to or through village brokers; sold to the agents of rice
millers; and sold to village shops. In any case, farmers sell paddy, not cleaned
rice, since they do not own modern rice-milling facilities.
4. Milk and Fodder
In contrast to wheat and basmati rice, there is little public intervention in
milk marketing and no intervention in fodder marketing. The self-sufficiency
ratio of milk in Pakistan is around 97 per cent and the deficit is compensated
by the import of milk powder (Anjum et al. 1989). The government controls
only the import and distribution of powdered milk. Private agencies have de-
veloped a network for marketing fresh milk (Khan and Shinzel 1982; Perry
1982; Anjum et al. 1989).
In the study area, the main milk sale outlet is through milk collectors called
dodhi. Farmers with regular surplus sell milk to dodhis who collect milk and
bring it to the town market by bicycle. Most dodhis belong to the Gujjar caste,
which is known as a dairy caste in a traditional Punjabi village (Chapter 2).
The price of milk collected in this manner is usually constant for a cropping
season. Within-village sales, both through village shops and through informal
relations, are also observed.
Official data on green fodder marketing are limited. Byerlee and Iqbal (1987),
using available wholesale prices of green fodder, concluded that the fodder
prices were the most volatile among the agricultural commodities, although
the seasonality of prices has decreased recently. Their conclusion was confirmed
by observations in the study villages. It was common for farmers to sell sur-
plus fodder or to purchase additional fodder to meet their requirement. How-
ever, farmers were reluctant to participate in market transactions because the
market was very thin. The farmers interviewed described complete depen-
dence on the market as too risky.
A market for dry fodder depicts a pattern similar to that for green fodder,
although the price of dry fodder is more stable within a year because dry
fodder can be stored more easily. Farmers use both paddy straw and wheat
straw (bhusa) as dry fodder. Bhusa is considered to be superior and is the
main commodity traded in the dry fodder market.
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A portion of surplus fodder is sold to landless livestock breeders or given to
them as in-kind payment. Milk production is one of the major income sources
for landless households in the rural Punjab (Hirashima 1978; Aslam and Haider
1982). Those landless households have to depend on farm households for the
green fodder they need. They are affected most adversely by an increase in
cereal and fodder prices, since they are net buyers of these commodities.
5. Market Participation by Sample Households
Sample households are classified by their market participation status (Table
4-1). Almost all the households sold basmati paddy, the most important cash
crop. No household purchased basmati. On the other hand, wheat was sold by
some households and purchased by others. Wheat is the staple food for farm-
ers in the region, but not all farm households are self-sufficient in wheat. A
number of marginal farmers did not produce a sufficient amount of wheat for
their consumption from their land. However, this does not imply that their
land is too small to produce a sufficient amount of wheat. Most of the deficit
households would not have needed to purchase wheat had they grown wheat
on all of their land. On the contrary, they chose to grow other crops, such as
fodder for livestock and vegetables for market sales, and chose to purchase
wheat from the market.
In contrast to cereal crops, sample households did not participate much in
green fodder markets. Only about one-third of the sample households sold
surplus fodder and less than 10 per cent purchased deficit fodder. This fact
seems to suggest that smaller farm households prefer to be self-sufficient in
green fodder even it may imply that they need to purchase deficit wheat. This
behavior is reasonable if the market for wheat purchase is stable and reliable.
TABLE  4-1
MARKET PARTICIPATION EXPERIENCE BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS
Sales Purchase
No. % No. %
Basmati paddy 290 99.7 0 0.0
Kharif fodder 97 33.3 15 5.2
Wheat 182 62.5 28 9.6
Rabi fodder 110 37.8 9 3.1
Source: The author’s calculation. The original information was collected by the Punjab
Economic Research Institute. See the text in Chapter 2 for more details.
Notes: Numbers show how many households sold or bought each crop in the study
period.
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II. Estimation of Variability in Harvest Prices
In this section, price variability of major agricultural products during harvest
periods is estimated. The price data are annual prices in the nearby wholesale
market. Secondary data of market prices are used since they are assumed to
be common to the sample households, except for the difference in transporta-
tion cost to the markets. This assumption will be investigated further in the
next section. Price variability is investigated for major production and con-
sumption items, such as basmati paddy, kharif fodder, wheat, rabi fodder,
milk, dry fodder, and concentrate feeds (cottonseed cake).5
1. The Empirical Model
What should matter to household decisions is price and income risk based
on a subjective distribution, about which no statistical information is avail-
able. Therefore, under the assumption that households have rational expecta-
tions, the subjective distribution is replaced with the estimates of distribution
parameters based on a statistical model.
To consider the effects of inflation and technological changes, a logarith-
mic model with a deterministic trend is used (Kurosaki 1997). Let pi represent
the market price of commodity i. Then, the estimated model is expressed as
lnp t uit i i it= + +α β ,
u uit p i t p ti i= +−µ ε, 1 ,
where t is a time variable measured in years, µ denotes an auto-regression
coefficient, and ε is a white noise with zero mean. Correction for a first-order
auto-regressive [AR(1)] structure is employed for all the commodities when
feasible so that residuals can be regarded as a white-noise process.
Expected prices are approximated as the natural exponential of fitted val-
ues defined as
ln ,p t uit i i p i ti= + + −ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,α β µ 1 (4.2)
where a hat denotes a regression estimate.
The CV and the correlation coefficients of prices are approximated as
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where σpi is a square root of the estimated variance of εpi in equation (4.1).
They are estimated from the residuals adjusted for the auto-regression.
2. Data
Equation (4.1) was estimated for the period from 1971/72 through 1990/
91. Prices observed in private wholesale markets were used. The government
support prices are expected to affect prices after harvest. To incorporate these
effects, the current support prices of basmati paddy were included in the esti-
mated equation for basmati price. The basmati support prices are usually fixed
when the farmers decide on their land allocation at the beginning of an agri-
cultural year. Since the wheat support price is not yet announced when the
farmers choose kharif crops, it is not included here.6
Market price data were obtained from two sources. The prices of wheat,
basmati, milk, and cottonseed cake were derived from reports on monthly
wholesale prices in Sheikhupura (GOP, Federal Bureau of Statistics, various
issues). Sheikhupura is the district headquarters of the villages surveyed and
it is located at about fifteen kilometers from the town. The same source pro-
vided price data for dry fodder, although for a shorter period. For the prices of
green fodder, there are very few data and in Sheikhupura data were not avail-
able. Therefore, the prices of green fodder in a nearby market of Faisalabad
were obtained from the Government of Punjab, Directorate of Agriculture
(Economics & Marketing) (various issues). To represent harvest months, the
average price in May and June was calculated for rabi crops, and that in De-
cember and January was calculated for kharif crops.7
3. Estimation Results
Table 4-2 presents the regression results for those prices for which data for
AR(1) correction were available. These results will be used in the structural
estimation of a household model in Chapter 6. Coefficient estimates for the
time trend were larger for green fodder: the annual growth rates of green fod-
der prices were approximately 12 per cent; the corresponding figures for milk
were 8 per cent and those for wheat and basmati were 7 per cent. This finding
is consistent with the description in Chapter 2 showing that the terms of trade
for livestock products improved against major crops during the 1980s. Infor-
mal interviews with sample households revealed that they also perceived that
green fodder was becoming a scarcer commodity.
Table 4-3 summarizes the CVs and time trends, including those for dry
fodder and cottonseed cake. Wheat price was more stable than the prices of
basmati and milk. The government policies of direct procurement at support
prices and public issue at fixed prices are one of the reasons for the stability in
wheat price.
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The CVs of green fodder prices were estimated at around 35 per cent in
kharif and 42 per cent in rabi. These values are much higher than those of
cereals and milk that are less than 20 per cent. Therefore, the regression re-
sults confirm empirically that green fodder price is more volatile than other
prices.
Information for dry fodder in Table 4-3 is not strictly comparable to others
since it was obtained from a regression model without auto-regression correc-
tion. Nevertheless, considering the data availability, it will serve as a rough
proxy. The CVs of dry fodder prices were estimated at around 20 to 22 per
cent. These values are higher than those of cereals and milk but lower than
those of green fodder. The estimated trend rates were also intermediate be-
tween those of cereals and those of green fodder.
The CV of cottonseed cake price was in the range of 16 to 20 per cent and
its time trend was estimated at around 4 to 5 per cent. Since the storability of
the commodity has similar characteristics to those of dry fodder, its pattern of
seasonality and CV were close to those of dry fodder. Its time trend was the
lowest among the commodities investigated in this section because the supply
of cottonseed increased rapidly in the late 1980s. This period is known as the
“silver revolution” (green revolution for cotton) in Pakistan.
TABLE  4-2
REGRESSION RESULTS OF TIME-SERIES MODEL FOR MARKET PRICES
Kharif Rabi Kharif Rabi
Fodder Fodder Milk Milk
Constant 4.966** 2.261*** 3.984*** 2.452*** 4.661*** 4.704***
(2.43) (11.4) (101.3) (9.78) (65.7) (97.8)
Time trend 0.071** 0.119*** 0.072*** 0.116*** 0.085*** 0.081***
(2.19) (3.86) (11.0) (2.99) (7.16) (9.52)
Log of support 0.027
price, basmati (0.07)
µ 0.452*** 0.403 0.424** 0.490 0.496** 0.239
(2.66) (1.25) (2.49) (1.58) (2.47) (1.13)
Standard error 0.141 0.353 0.086 0.415 0.140 0.151
R2 0.930 0.847 0.965 0.816 0.935 0.915
No. of
observations 19 11 19 11 19 19
Source: The author’s calculation. See the text for the data source for regression.
Notes: Dependent variables are log of prices; µ is the coefficient of the first-order auto-
regression in the error-term, estimated by the Cochrane-Orcutt method. Numbers in the
parenthesis are absolute values of t-statistics.
*** Significant at 1% level and ** at 5% level (two-sided test).
Basmati Wheat
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III. Testing Spatial and Intertemporal Price Integration
In this section, market price integration and the effects of government inter-
vention on it are tested in the case of grain markets in the Pakistan Punjab.8
The analysis focuses on wheat, the staple food of the nation, supplemented by
an analysis on basmati paddy for comparison purposes. Most of the existing
studies on market performance in Pakistan are descriptive, except for the work
by Faiz Mohammad who analyzed market prices using a simple econometric
model (Mohammad 1983, 1985). In the model in this section, quantity vari-
ables, such as market surplus or government release, are incorporated to ex-
plain the price relations realized in private marketing channels.
1. Methodology
The literature on market performances in developing countries has mark-
edly expanded in recent years. Starting from the classic studies carried out by
Lele (1971) and Jones (1972), the literature now covers a wide range of coun-
TABLE  4-3
SUMMARY RESULTS OF PRICE REGRESSION MODELS
Annual CV of
Trend Rates Prices
(%) (%)
Basmati paddy 7.1 14.1 C-O AR(1) 19
Wheat 7.2 8.6 C-O AR(1) 19
Milk in kharif 8.5 14.0 C-O AR(1) 19
Milk in rabi 8.1 15.1 C-O AR(1) 19
Green fodder in kharif 11.9 35.3 C-O AR(1) 11
Green fodder in rabi 11.6 41.5 C-O AR(1) 11
Dry fodder in kharif 9.3 22.3 OLS 6
Dry fodder in rabi 8.6 19.8 OLS 6
Cottonseed cake in kharif 4.9 19.8 C-O AR(1) 19
Cottonseed cake in rabi 4.3 16.4 C-O AR(1) 19
Source : The author’s calculation. See the text for the data source for regression.
Notes : 1. Due to missing data, estimation methods and number of observations are
different among models. Missing observations were more frequent in ear-
lier years.
2. Estimation methods: C-O AR(1) by the Cochrane-Orcutt method assuming
first-order auto-regression in error terms; OLS by ordinary least squares.
3. CV (coefficient of variation) of prices is defined as the residual variation not
explained by the model divided by the predicted value from the estimated
model.
Estimation
Methods
No. of
Observations
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tries and a number of sophisticated methods (e.g., Ravallion 1986; Baulch
1995, 1996; Goletti, Ahmed, and Farid 1995; Hayami and Kawagoe 1993).
As Baulch (1996) argued, recent methods based on time-series analyses, such
as the Ravallion model, co-integration, and Granger causality tests, failed to
incorporate the nonlinearity caused by the existence of transaction costs and
noncontinuous trade flows. Therefore, instead of applying these time-series
models, this study adopted an empirical strategy to go back to the arbitrage
condition that forms the basis of these studies.
The arbitrage condition needs to be satisfied for prices in a spatial or
intertemporal competitive equilibrium (Takayama and Judge 1971; Williams
and Wright 1991). Arbitrage (in)equality is satisfied when either of the fol-
lowing two conditions is met. First, if transactions occur between two states
of a commodity, price differential should equal transaction costs; the differen-
tial should not be larger than the transaction costs, because it implies an arbi-
trage opportunity. Second, if transactions do not occur, price differential should
be smaller than or equal to transaction costs. If the price differential is larger
than the transaction costs when transactions do not occur, the arbitrage condi-
tions are clearly violated and the markets are inefficient (Baulch 1995). The
transactions between two states include spatial (transportation/trade),
intertemporal (storage), or vertical (processing) transactions. When the arbi-
trage condition holds as an equality, prices in the corresponding two markets
are said to be integrated spatially, intertemporally, or vertically.
The arbitrage condition prevents unnecessarily volatile movement of prices.
It transmits price signals smoothly from urban food-deficit to rural food-sur-
plus areas or from food-deficit to food-surplus period. In this sense, the condi-
tion is necessary for the efficient performance of markets. A well-integrated
market system is a key to the efficient allocation of productive resources. It
also contributes to household and regional food security. When the arbitrage
condition is satisfied, price risk is reduced because a local shock is transmit-
ted to integrated markets. For example, from an individual farmer’s view-
point, the price of a grain in the local market and its yield at his own farm are
likely to be highly correlated with a negative sign when the market is less
integrated with other markets. As the local market becomes more spatially
integrated, the correlation becomes weaker and yield risk at an individual
farm is absorbed in the wider geographical coverage of well-integrated mar-
kets.
2. Effects of Government Support Prices on Farm-Gate Prices after
Harvest
The spatial integration of prices and the effects of government procure-
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ment on it were tested using three-year cross-section data on farm-gate prices
of wheat and basmati paddy after harvest. Most of the sample households sold
these commodities immediately after harvest in the village where they lived.
Enumerators recorded prices received by farmers for the most representative
transaction. Some farmers brought the commodity directly to the government
procurement center or to the town mandi. In these cases, transportation costs
were subtracted to obtain the farm-gate price. Let Pf denote the farm-gate
price recorded in this way.
Analytical and Empirical Models
Since Pf is the price observed in actual transactions in the villages, it is
necessary to test whether the arbitrage equality holds or not between the farm-
gate price and the price in the town (P*). Denoting per-unit transportation
costs from the farm to the town by T, the arbitrage relation is expressed alge-
braically as
P P Tf* .= + (4.4)
Assuming absolute market margins, the following simple model of transpor-
tation costs is used in the empirical investigation.
T D Q= +β β1 21/ , (4.5)
where 1 and 2 are parameters to be estimated, D is the distance of the farm
from the town, and Q is the quantity marketed. 1 is the marginal transporta-
tion cost per unit-distance that is invariant to Q and 2 is a fixed cost of each
transaction. When the values of both 1 and 2 are positive, there is a scale
economy in transportation. Since we are interested in the effects of govern-
ment intervention, the government support price (Pp) was used as a proxy for
P*. Since Pp is independent of transactions in villages, Pf was used as the
dependent variable explained by Pp and other independent variables.
Thus, by inserting equation (4.5) into equation (4.4) and adding the error
term u, the empirical equation becomes
P P D Q uf p= + − − +α α β β1 2 1 21/ . (4.6)
Equation (4.6) was estimated by a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method
since the variable 1/Q is endogenous to household decisions. Using all sample
observations with market surplus, the model was estimated for wheat and
basmati paddy.
Estimation Results and Discussion
The estimation results for wheat are reported in Table 4-4. First, the regres-
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sion fit was high (adjusted R2 =0.99). Second, coefficient estimates for trans-
portation costs showed the correct sign. However, the coefficient on 1/Q was
not statistically significant. Therefore, the model was re-estimated without
1/Q (“Model B”). Third, the coefficient on Pp was 0.95, reasonably close to
unity, which is the theoretical prediction in equation (4.4).9
The regression results for wheat show that the farm-gate price after harvest
is explained almost wholly by the government support price and the distance
to the town. Recall that most sample households did not bring wheat to the
procurement center but sold it to private middlemen in the villages. Even in
these cases, the farm-gate prices were integrated efficiently with the support
price in the town. Active competition among middlemen and substantial pro-
curement by the government in the town are responsible for the efficient per-
formance. In other words, the rural marketing network of private middlemen
contributes to the spatial integration of wheat prices. Obviously, further re-
search is needed to generalize this result for the whole province or for Paki-
stan. Nevertheless, the existing literature on the spatial integration of whole-
sale markets in Pakistan seems to indicate that the relations hold to some
extent. Studies by Faiz Mohammad (1983, 1985), who examined market price
correlations, and by Kurosaki (1994), who applied Ravallion’s model of short-
run and long-run integration, all supported the view that most wholesale mar-
kets in Pakistan’s Punjab are integrated spatially.
A similar regression model was estimated for basmati paddy (Table 4-5).
First, adjusted R2 was very low, showing that a large portion of price variation
could not be explained by the support price, the distance to the town, and the
quantity marketed. Second, both coefficient estimates on D and 1/Q were nega-
tive and statistically significant, suggesting the existence of scale economy in
transportation. The contrasting results for the coefficient on 1/Q between wheat
and basmati could be due to a difference in the nature of the two commodities.
Wheat is a staple food for which village demand exists even for a small quan-
tity. On the other hand, since basmati paddy is a cash crop in the area that has
to be sent to rice mills for processing, a large lot in a village has a natural
advantage in transportation. Third, the coefficient on Pp was 0.32, a value
significantly smaller than unity, which is the theoretical prediction of perfect
arbitrage.
The contrast is striking: the farm-gate price of wheat is explained well by
the support price and the distance, with the coefficient on the support price
close to unity; the farm-gate price of basmati paddy is not explained well by
these variables and the coefficient on the support price is not close to unity.
This contrast could be due to a difference in the institutional setting of the
government price support. A public procurement center for wheat is opened
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TABLE  4-4
2SLS ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR WHEAT FARM-GATE PRICES
Explanatory Statistics of Explan-
Variables atory Variables
Intercept 5.066*** 4.844***
(6.390) (6.319)
Pp (Rs./40 kg) 0.949*** 0.950*** 96.53
(125.6) (126.9) [11.81]
D (km) −0.361*** −0.367*** 8.99
(−16.51) (−17.40) [4.19]
1/Q (1/40 kg) −6.888 0.0306
(−1.220) [0.0387]
Adjusted R2 0.989 0.989
Source : Same as Table 4-1.
Notes : 1. Estimated by 2SLS with instrumental variables that include Pp, D, the op-
erational acreage of the farm, family size, livestock size, and dummy vari-
ables for tractor and tubewell ownership. t-statistics are indicated in the
parenthesis.
2. Numbers under the column “Statistics of Explanatory Variables” indicate
mean and standard deviations (in the brackets) of explanatory variables.
3. Dependent variable is Pf whose mean is 93.20 and standard deviation is
11.50.
4. The number of observations is 182.
  *** Significant at 1% level (two-sided test).
Model A Model B
in the town every year with substantial procurement, while the direct procure-
ment of basmati paddy by the public sector is negligible. The support price
for basmati paddy is not transmitted smoothly to farmers through the indirect
price support by cleaned-rice procurement. Whether the unexplained varia-
tion in basmati paddy prices can be explained efficiently by a difference in
marketing methods and in opportunity costs of production factors for farmers
and middlemen is an interesting and promising avenue for future research,10
for which more detailed information on marketing is required.
3. Effects of Government Release on the Seasonality of Wholesale Wheat
Prices
How does the public release of wheat to markets in lean months affect
intertemporal price changes?  This issue was addressed using data on monthly
wholesale prices in ten major markets in the province (Lahore, Faisalabad,
Rawalpindi, Multan, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Sargodha, Okara, Sahiwal, and
Sheikhupura) during the 1989/90 to 1991/92 food years11 as well as the dis-
trict-wise data on the quantity of wheat released in the province. The data for
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prices were derived from GOP, Federal Bureau of Statistics (various issues)
and the data for wheat release were directly obtained from the provincial food
department.
 Analytical and Empirical Models
Arbitrage (in)equality for intertemporal transactions (i.e., storage) is con-
sidered to hold when either of the following relations is satisfied between the
current price (Pt) and the immediate future price (Pt+1) (Williams and Wright
1991):
P C r E Pt t t+( ) +( ) = [ ]+1 1 , St > 0 (4.7a)
P C r E Pt t t+( ) +( ) ≥ [ ]+1 1 , St = 0 (4.7b)
where C is the physical storage cost per period, r is the interest rate, Et[..] is an
expectation operator at t, and St is the quantity of private storage carried over
from period t to t+1.
Considering the nature of the public wheat release policy, two extreme situ-
TABLE  4-5
2SLS ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR BASMATI PADDY FARM-GATE PRICES
Explanatory Statistics of Explan-
Variables atory Variables
Intercept 89.44*** 89.13***
(23.85) (23.40)
Pp (Rs./40kg) 0.324*** 0.320*** 142.8
(12.40) (12.07) [6.18]
D (km) −0.157*** −0.133*** 9.44
(−4.055) (−3.465) [4.26]
1/Q (1/40kg) −30.851*** 0.0217
(−3.023) [0.0307]
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.354
Source : Same as Table 4-1.
Notes : 1. Estimated by 2SLS with instrumental variables that include Pp, D, the op-
erational acreage of the farm, family size, livestock size, and dummy vari-
ables for tractor and tubewell ownership. t-statistics are indicated in the
parenthesis.
2. Numbers under the column “Statistics of Explanatory Variables” indicate
mean and standard deviations (in the brackets) of explanatory variables.
3. Dependent variable is Pf whose mean is 133.50 and standard deviation is
3.44.
4. The number of observations is 287.
  *** Significant at 1% level (two-sided test).
Model A Model B
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ations can be considered to stylize private storage activities in this context.
First, if wheat released by the government and wheat stored by the private
sector are perfect substitutes, and, if the public release is continued as long as
market demand exists at the issue price,12 then, the private sector stores wheat
only in the early months when it expects zero public release (equation (4.7a)
holds). Once the private sector expects a positive public release, no private
storage is carried over since it inevitably incurs a loss (the inequality in equa-
tion (4.7b) holds). This is a situation with full government effects.
On the contrary, if wheat released by the government and wheat stored by
the private sector form two completely segmented markets, or, if the public
release is cut off with probability one at the level lower than the market de-
mand at the issue price, then, market demand for private storage persists even
when the government releases wheat. Therefore, market prices continue to
rise regularly throughout a food year, following the equality in equation (4.7a).
This is a situation without government effects.
The reality is expected to lie between these two cases. In early months
when the quantity of public release is small, market prices rise in a way close
to the equality in equation (4.7a). The market is dominated by privately stored
wheat. As the public release increases in lean months, private storage begins
to be crowded out by publicly stored wheat, but not completely. Figure 4-1
graphically supports this hypothesis. From May to October, market prices rise
regularly; from October to April, intertemporal price relations vary from year
to year.
Based on the model in equation (4.7), the following empirical model was
adopted, in which the impact of public release was estimated simultaneously
with the seasonal patterns:
P P D ut t g t t= ⋅ ( ) +−1 exp + ,α β , (4.8)
where α and  are parameters to be estimated, Dg is a dummy variable for
government wheat release, and u is an error term with zero mean. α is an
estimate for the rate of total storage costs,13 which should have a positive
value.  represents the effects of government release on price changes. If the
value is zero, the government wheat release has no effect on market prices; if
it is negative, price rises are repressed by government release; and if  com-
pletely offsets the total storage costs (α+=0), the government release at the
issue price stabilizes market prices completely, a situation with full govern-
ment effects.
Dg,t is defined as a threshold dummy variable that takes the value of unity
when per capita release in a district in month t exceeds some critical level and
takes the value of zero otherwise. The use of this variable enables to under-
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stand the effects of an active government intervention into private markets,
which occur in the late months of a food year (Figure 4-1).
Estimation Results and Discussion
Table 4-6 shows the results estimated by a maximum likelihood (ML)
method assuming the normality of u. The threshold level for Dg,t was set at
2.5 kg per capita. In the initial regression, α and  were allowed to vary from
market to market and from year to year. However, since differences among
markets were not statistically significant (a finding consistent with spatially
integrated markets), estimation results without location dummies are reported
in Table 4-6. In Model A, α and  were allowed to vary from year to year.
Since the null hypothesis that α is constant over years is not rejected at 10 per
Fig. 4–1. Seasonality of Wheat Wholesale Prices and Public Wheat Releases
Source : Drawn by the author. See the text for original data.
Notes : 1. The wholesale wheat price index is defined as the average of wholesale
wheat price indices in the ten wholesale markets. The wholesale wheat
price index in each market each year is an index with government sup-
port price in the year taken as 100.
2. The issue quantity is defined as the sum of government release of wheat
in the ten markets each month.
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cent by the Wald test, estimation results with the restriction of constant α are
reported as well (Model B).
According to the results of Model B, α was estimated at 1.7 per cent per
month, or 21 per cent per year. This is the estimate for total storage costs.
According to State Bank of Pakistan Bulletin, market interest rates during the
study period were about 11 per cent (the average lending rate from commer-
cial banks to the private sector) or 12 to 12.5 per cent (the short-term lending
rate from the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan). A reliable study
estimated the physical storage loss at around 7 per cent per year (Pinckney
1989b). Therefore, the estimate for total storage costs at 21 per cent seems
reasonable and can be attributed to interests (12 per cent), storage loss (7 per
cent), and other physical storage costs (2 per cent).
Parameter estimate for  was significantly negative in 1989/90 but not
significant in the next two years. Therefore, the government release repressed
price rises in 1989/90 but its effects were not discernible in 1990/91 and
1991/92. On the other hand, the null hypothesis that α+ =0 for 1989/90 was
rejected at 10 per cent by the Wald test for both models. This suggests that
even in the year 1989/90 when the government release did repress market
TABLE  4-6
ML ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR INTERTEMPORAL WHEAT PRICE RELATIONS
Parameter Model A Model B
α1989/90 0.0208 (3.676)***
α1990/91 0.0175 (3.371)***
α1991/92 0.0139 (3.296)***
αcommon 0.0167 (5.882)***
1989/90 −0.0140 (−1.872)* −0.0099 (−1.756)*
1990/91 −0.0043 (−0.633) −0.0035 (−0.667)
1991/92 0.0076 (1.334) 0.0048 (1.010)
R2 0.946 0.946
Log likelihood −820.440 −820.925
Source : Same as Table 4-2.
Notes : 1. Asymptotic t-statistics are indicated in the parenthesis.
2. Dependent variable is Pt whose mean is 114.8 and standard deviation is
16.0.
3. The number of observations is 300 (= 10 markets×3 years×10 months).  Each
year in each market consists of ten months to avoid the discontinuity of
wheat in a food year. The model in (4.8) is estimated for Pt with t = June to
March.
4. In each year with 100 observations, the government release dummy (Dg)
takes the value of unity in 53 cases (1989/90), 54 cases (1990/91), and 51
cases (1991/92).
  *** Significant at 1% level and * at 10% level (two-sided test).
OUTPUT  MARKETS 75
price rises, the prices did not remain at the issue price but increased at a re-
pressed rate.
These findings indicate two characteristics of the wheat markets. First, from
private traders’ viewpoint, there is an uncertainty regarding how sufficient the
government release in the next month will be. In spite of the official policy of
unlimited release at the issue price, the government follows its annual sched-
ule for wheat release with some flexibility to adjust the actual quantity to the
ongoing market situation. Therefore, the actual quantity of wheat released by
the government is likely to be short of the market demand but be able to meet
a substantial portion. Because of this uncertainty, the private sector has an
incentive to store wheat even in lean months.
Second, the wheat released by the government and the wheat stored by the
private sector are neither perfect substitutes nor segmented commodities. The
main reason for imperfect substitutability is that a major portion of the gov-
ernment-released wheat is marketed as wheat flour. Demand for wheat com-
prises direct demand for consumption and derived demand for storage. The
first demand can be met by the government-released wheat flour, but the stor-
age demand cannot be met by the flour. In addition, a difference in quality
might exist between government-released and privately stored wheat.
Because of these characteristics, the government effects were different
among years. Judging from the long-term trend, the national wheat produc-
tion in 1988/89 was close to normal while that in 1989/90 and 1990/91 was
below normal. In a food year after a bad domestic harvest, the uncertainty
regarding government release increases. The substitutability between govern-
ment-released and privately stored wheat decreases because the premium for
storability increases. Therefore, the effects of government release on price
changes become insignificant in a bad harvest year, as indicated in the regres-
sion results for 1990/91 and 1991/92. Since the actual quantity of wheat re-
leased by the government in these two years was not below that in 1989/90
(Figure 4-1), the observed price relations cannot be justified easily ex post.
Nevertheless, it might have been individually rational ex ante for private trad-
ers to continue to keep store wheat in anticipation of a significant decrease in
the quantity released by the government. Whether this behavior of private
traders was a collectively rational and efficient response to uncertainty or an
excessive response without economic justification deserves further investiga-
tion.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, the nature of agricultural markets in the study area has been
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characterized, with emphasis placed on the variability of market prices. The
government intervenes directly in wheat markets and indirectly in basmati
paddy markets. Public intervention is almost nil in milk and fodder market-
ing. Regression results in this chapter have contrasted the difference in price
risk among commodities due to the difference in these marketing institutions.
First, results from the model of annual price variation have shown that green
fodder prices increased more rapidly and were more volatile than the prices of
cereals and milk. This implies that, by growing fodder on their farms as an
input for livestock production, households can obtain a kind of price insur-
ance. This motivation is expected to become stronger as the herd size of milk
livestock increases relative to the land size.
Second, investigation on spatial price relations after harvest has demon-
strated that the farm-gate prices of wheat were mostly explained by the sup-
port price whereas those of basmati paddy showed variations that could not
be explained. This difference is likely to be due to a difference in the price
support mechanism: direct (wheat) and indirect (basmati paddy).
Third, empirical analysis on the intertemporal price relations and the ef-
fects of public wheat release on them has shown that wheat prices regularly
increased at the rate of storage costs in the first half of a food year, but the
price rise was repressed by the government release in the second half in a year
with a normal wheat harvest.
The second and third findings imply that the price risk, in terms of the
variation unexplained by arbitrage conditions, is the smallest for wheat after
harvest. The price risk might be somewhat higher for basmati paddy after
harvest and wheat in lean months. Policy implications of these findings are
fully discussed in Kurosaki (1996a). It might be sufficient to state here that
private traders in Pakistan are capable of achieving efficient price relations,
which support the current wheat policies of deregulation and liberalization, as
long as the policy revision is marginal.
A practical implication of the findings in this chapter is that it is justifiable
to use parameters characterizing annual price risks in Table 4-3 to represent
price risks facing sample households. As long as a shock to local markets is
absorbed spatially and intertemporally, households need to care only about a
yield shock idiosyncratic to their farms and price and yield shocks common to
the integrated markets in harvest months. Since the price integration was found
to be weaker for basmati and lean-month-wheat than for harvest-month-wheat,
it is likely that the price variabilities shown in Table 4-3 were underestimated
to some extent. At the same time, any econometric analysis that estimates the
price variability as the unexplained variation of a regression model is likely to
overestimate the variability due to mis-specifications. Since the magnitude of
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over- and underestimation cannot be quantified, it is assumed in the following
chapters that the net effects after canceling each other are negligible.
Notes
1 In 1996, thanks to the construction of a national highway close to the sample
villages, road conditions were improved significantly.
2 Deregulation policies include the lift of the ban on private inter-provincial trade
of wheat and wheat de-rationing. See Cornelisse and Naqvi (1987, 1989), Alder-
man, Chaudhry, and Garcia (1988), Pinckney (1989b), and Ender (1992) for de-
tails.
3 The PASSCO is a parastatal agency that procures and stores wheat for inter-pro-
vincial distribution. Among the four provinces of Pakistan, Punjab is the only
surplus province. The PASSCO is responsible for the supply of wheat to the deficit
provinces.
4 The figure was obtained directly from the PASSCO.
5 Results for the first five commodities are cited from Kurosaki (1997).
6 Obviously, the past support prices of wheat may affect expectation on the market
price of wheat. The empirical model for wheat price incorporates the effects of
past wheat prices in the market, which reflects the information on the support
prices until then.
7 Since green fodder is marketed continuously before the peak of grain harvest,
other months were also examined for fodder prices. However, this adjustment did
not change the regression results qualitatively. Therefore, the results based on the
months described in the text are reported.
8 This section is extracted from Kurosaki (1996a).
9 Strictly speaking, the Wald test rejected the null hypothesis that α2 = 1 at 1 per
cent level. However, P* in the theoretical model in equation (4.4) should be a
price in the town net of marketing costs that are not incurred in transactions in
villages. These marketing costs include, for example, commission fee, facility
usage fee, the opportunity cost of waiting in front of the procurement center, etc.
When the variable Pp in equation (4.6) was replaced by the support price dis-
counted by 3 per cent, the estimate for α2 became much closer to unity and α2 = 1
was no longer rejected. In this sense, the coefficient estimate of 0.95 for α2 was
“reasonably” close to unity.
10 Hayami and Kawagoe (1993) explored this direction for the case of upland crops
in Indonesia.
11 A food year corresponds to the period from May to April, which implies a one
year lag in wheat accounting. For example, the wheat crop harvested in April–
May 1990 is counted as a produce of 1989/90 fiscal year but as a food grain for
1990/91 food year.
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12 This is the official stance of the government release policy (Pinckney 1989b).
13 This approximation is more precise when the physical storage cost C is propor-
tional to the initial value of the commodity. By inserting C = cPt on the left-hand
side of the equality in equation (4.7a),
P C r P c r P E Pt t t t t+( ) +( ) = +( ) +( ) = ⋅ ( ) = [ ]+1 1 1 1exp ,α
∴ ≈ +α c r.
The physical storage costs include storage loss, rental fee for storage space,
chemicals costs, etc. Among them, the storage loss, which is expected to be the
most important under the conditions in Pakistan, is likely to be proportional to the
initial quantity. Therefore, the approximation of C by cPt might be justifiable.
